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Considerable research finds that oil price
shocks have affected U.S. output and inflation
(Hamilton 1983, 1988, 1996; Tatom 1988; Mork
1989, 1994; Kahn and Hampton 1990; Hunting-
ton 1998). Research also supports the view that
these shocks have been an important source 
of economic fluctuation in the United States
over the past three decades (Miller, Supel, and
Turner 1980; Finn 1991; Kim and Loungani
1992). This research suggests rising oil prices
reduced output and increased inflation in the
1970s and early 1980s and falling oil prices
boosted output and lowered inflation in the
mid- to late 1980s. Nevertheless, other studies
argue it was not the oil price shocks themselves
but monetary policy’s response to them that
caused the fluctuations in aggregate economic
activity (Bohi 1989; Bernanke, Gertler, and
Watson 1997).
Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (BGW) show
that the U.S. economy responds differently to an
oil price shock when the federal funds rate is
held constant than it does when the rate is un-
constrained. In the unconstrained case, a posi-
tive oil price shock leads to a rise in the federal
funds rate and a decline in real gross domestic
product. With the federal funds rate held con-
stant, BGW find a positive oil price shock leads
to an increase in real GDP. Defining neutral
monetary policy as one in which the federal
funds rate is constant, BGW argue that mone-
tary policy has not been neutral in response to
oil price shocks. They contend the difference in
real GDP’s behavior shows it is monetary pol-
icy’s response to oil price shocks that causes
aggregate economic activity to fluctuate.
A constant federal funds rate is not neces-
sarily the only definition of monetary neutrality
in the face of a supply shock. Friedman (1959)
suggests a constant monetary aggregate; Gor-
don (1998) suggests that neutrality occurs when
the monetary authority adjusts policy to hold
nominal GDP constant.
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For this article, we construct a vector auto-
regressive (VAR) model of the U.S. economy
similar to the BGW model to examine whether
the definition of monetary neutrality affects the
conclusion that monetary policy’s response to
oil price shocks accounts for the fluctuations 
in aggregate economic activity. We find that
with the BGW definition of neutral monetary
policy—a constant federal funds rate—oil price
shocks have prompted a tightening of monetary
policy. However, under a different definition of
neutrality—constant nominal GDP—it could be
argued that the Federal Reserve has taken a
neutral course.
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MODEL, INTERPRETATION, AND ESTIMATION
Our model is a variant of BGW’s VAR model.
Both consist of seven variables and equations
representing real GDP, the GDP deflator, a com-
modity price index, the price of oil, the federal
funds rate, and short- and long-term interest
rates. Both versions of the model can be used
to represent money demand, as well as the rela-
tionships between oil prices, aggregate eco-
nomic activity, financial variables, and inflation.
For oil prices, the BGW model uses the
“net oil price” proposed by Hamilton (1996),
constructed by calculating the difference be-
tween the current price and the maximum price
seen in the past twelve months (in logs).
Hamilton’s net oil price is equal to the differ-
ence or zero, whichever is greater. In addition,
the federal funds rate does not enter the BGW
model directly but, rather, works through the
term structure of interest rates. The short- and
long-term market rates are decomposed into
two parts—an expectations of future funds rate
component and a term premium component.
Our version of the model has two oil price
variables: the Hamilton net oil price and the
price of oil. Following Balke, Brown, and Yücel
(1999), we include an additional oil price vari-
able to allow for the differential effects of rising
and falling oil prices. The net oil price captures
only rising oil prices. Unlike BGW, we do not
impose a structure on the model and include
the federal funds rate directly in the VAR.
Simple theory can help predict how an oil
price shock will affect the variables in either
model. Higher energy prices resulting from an
oil price shock cause a temporary shift in the
production function, leading to lower output.
The reduction in output, ceteris paribus, results
in an excess demand for goods and an increase
in the interest rate. The fall in output and in-
crease in the interest rate, in turn, reduce the
demand for real cash balances, and given a
nominal quantity of money, the price level rises.
Therefore, we would expect an oil price shock
to lower GDP and increase both interest rates
and the price level.
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According to Gordon (1998), the Federal
Reserve maintains neutrality in the face of a
supply shock by acting to hold nominal spend-
ing constant. Hence, under this circumstance a
decline in GDP, an increase in interest rates, and
an increase in the price level can be consistent
with a neutral monetary policy—as long as
nominal GDP remains constant. In contrast, BGW
define a neutral monetary policy as one in which
the Federal Reserve holds the federal funds rate
constant in the face of a supply shock regard-
less of the consequences for the price level and
nominal GDP. Because a supply shock might
boost short-term interest rates, however, hold-
ing the federal funds rate constant could be
interpreted as accommodative if it results in
gains in nominal GDP.
Data
To examine the neutrality issues, we use
data similar to BGW’s. We use monthly data for
January 1965 through December 1997.
3 The real
oil price variable is the producers price index of
crude oil, with the Hamilton net oil price calcu-
lated from the same series. GDP is in constant
1987 dollars. We use the Chow–Lin procedure
to obtain a monthly GDP series from the quar-
terly data, with personal consumption expen-
ditures, industrial production, and total non-
agricultural employment as reference series. We
also use the Chow–Lin procedure to obtain a
monthly GDP deflator series from the quarterly
data, with the producer price indexes for capi-
tal equipment, finished goods, intermediate
materials, and crude materials as the reference
series. The commodity price index is the spot
market index for all commodities from the
Commodity Research Bureau. The short-term
interest rate is the three-month Treasury bill.
The long-term interest rate is the ten-year
Treasury bond. All three interest rate variables
are from Citibase.
Following BGW, we use log levels of real
GDP, the price deflator, and the commodity
price. The federal funds rate and the long-term
interest rate are kept in levels. We use log first
differences of the real oil price to make it com-
parable to the Hamilton oil price variable. Be-
cause it can be generated by an identity from
the oil price series, the net oil price is included
as a regressor in each equation, along with the
real oil price, but is not a left-hand variable itself.
Variance Decomposition and Impulse Responses
We use both a variance decomposition
and impulse responses to assess the relationship
between oil price shocks and aggregate eco-
nomic activity. A variance decomposition appor-
tions the variance of forecast errors in a given
variable to its own shocks and those of the
other variables in the VAR. It allows us to assess
the relative importance of oil price shocks to the
volatility of the other variables.
Impulse response functions allow us to
examine the dynamic effects of oil price shocks
on U.S. economic activity and inflation. The im-
pulse response function traces over time theFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 18
effects on a variable of an exogenous shock to
another variable. The persistence of a shock
tells us how fast the system adjusts back to equi-
librium. The faster a shock dampens, the faster
the adjustment. We analyze the effects of a one-
time oil price shock and trace its effect on each
of the variables.
We use a Choleski decomposition to con-
struct the variance decompositions and impulse
responses. This technique decomposes the
residual (µ i) from each equation in the VAR sys-
tem into a linear combination of the residuals
from the other equations (µ j) and an orthogo-
nal element (ν i). The structure is as follows:4
(1) µ gdp = ν gdp
(2) µ defl = c21µ gdp + ν defl
(3) µ pcom = c31µ gdp + c32µ defl + ν pcom
(4) µ poil = c41µ gdp + c42µ defl + c43µ pcom + ν poil
(5) µ ff = c51µ gdp + c52µ defl + c53µ pcom
+ c54µ poil + ν ff
(6) µ rs = c61µ gdp + c62µ defl + c63µ pcom
+ c64µ poil + c65µ ff + ν rs
(7) µ rl = c71µ gdp + c72µ defl + c73µ pcom
+ c74µ poil + c75µ ff + c76µ rs + ν rl ,
where µ gdp is the residual from the real GDP
equation,  µ defl is the residual from the GDP
deflator equation, µ pcom is the residual from the
commodity price equation, µ poil is the residual
from the oil price equation, µ ff is the residual
from the federal funds rate equation, µ rs is the
residual from the short-term interest rate equa-
tion, and µ rl is the residual from the long-term
interest rate equation.
The decomposition structure implies that
unexpected changes in real GDP (µ gdp) arise
from any of the specified variables only with a
lag. Unexpected changes in the deflator (µ defl)
can arise contemporaneously from innovations
in real GDP but can arise from other variables
only with a lag. Similarly, as we move down 
the equations, unexpected changes in one of
the left-hand-side variables can arise contem-
poraneously from innovations in variables on
the left-hand side of the equations preceding 
it, but can arise from the variables on the left-
hand side of the equations succeeding it only
with a lag.
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In addition to the standard impulse
responses, we also calculate impulse responses
under a counterfactual case in which the federal
funds rate is held constant, which is akin to the
Sims–Zha case in BGW.
6 In the Sims–Zha case,
the federal funds rate response is shut down by
setting the rate at its baseline level—that is, its
value in the absence of an oil price shock.
OIL PRICE SHOCKS AND 
AGGREGATE ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
Using the model and procedures de-
scribed above, we examine the sources of vari-
ation in each variable and the estimated re-
sponses of aggregate economic activity to an oil
price shock with the federal funds rate free to
respond and with the rate constant. We find that
innovations in the oil price itself—except pos-
sibly through a manifestation in commodity
prices—have little effect on monetary policy
during the estimation period.
7 We also find that
holding the federal funds rate constant prevents
a decline in real GDP, but at the cost of higher
inflation.
Variance Decomposition
The variance decomposition suggests that
oil price shocks are not a major source of
volatility for most of the variables in the model.
As Table 1 shows, for many of the variables the
largest source of shock other than the variable
itself is the commodity price; changes in oil
prices are a minimal source of disturbance to
these variables.
8 The commodity price is the
source of 65 percent of the volatility in the price
deflator, about 40 percent of the volatility in the
federal funds rate and short-term interest rates,
and 50 percent of the volatility in long-term
interest rates. 
For real GDP, the largest source of shocks
is changes in the federal funds rate, which con-
tributes nearly 44 percent of the volatility. The GDP
variable itself accounts for about 30 percent of
its own volatility, and the commodity price ac-
counts for 6.5 percent of the volatility. Oil prices
contribute only 1.4 percent of GDP volatility.
Table 1
Variance Decomposition
RGDP Deflator Pcom Oil FF Short rate Long rate
RGDP 29.7 1.2 6.5 1.4 43.9 15.3 2.0
Deflator 8.4 21.6 64.2 .2 3.8 .8 .9
Pcom 5.8 3.4 76.9 .3 9.5 2.8 1.1
Oil 3.8 2.2 10.3 75.4 3.9 2.7 1.7
FF 22.7 5.2 38.7 1.1 20.7 10.8 .7
Short rate 20.8 5.7 40.8 .7 15.6 15.8 .8
Long rate 13.7 10.7 51.7 .6 6.4 8.0 8.8
NOTE:The variable on the left is being decomposed by the right-hand-side variables shown at the top.19 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 1999
Although the federal funds rate is the
largest source of volatility for real GDP, the
rate’s movements do not arise from changes in
oil prices. The oil price contributes only about 1
percent of the volatility in the federal funds rate.
Commodity prices are the largest source of
volatility for the rate, while GDP accounts for
almost 23 percent of the volatility. The funds
rate itself is the third-largest source of its own
volatility, contributing nearly 21 percent. Table
1 shows that the variance decomposition for all
three interest rates is very similar, particularly
for the federal funds and short-term rates.
These findings suggest it is not the oil
price itself but perhaps its manifestation in com-
modity prices that affects the volatility of eco-
nomic activity. The commodity price is the
largest source of fluctuation for all variables
except GDP and oil prices. The main sources of
GDP volatility are GDP itself and changes in the
federal funds rate. A change in commodity
prices is the source of nearly half the volatility
for all interest rates in the model. The fed funds
rate seems to be responding to changes in gen-
eral commodity prices, not necessarily just the
oil price, because changes in oil prices are the
smallest source of volatility for the fed funds rate.
Impulse Responses
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses to
an oil price shock in the base case (solid line).
As is shown, a positive oil price shock leads to
a decline in real GDP, a rise in the price level,
and increases in short- and long-term interest
rates.
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GDP and Inflation Response. We find that a
one-standard-deviation shock to the real oil
price leads to a transitory decline in real GDP.
The maximum decline in real GDP is about
0.005 percent and is realized in the thirteenth
month.
Our findings are similar to those of
Hamilton (1983), Tatom (1988), Mork (1989,
1994), and Huntington (1998), who find de-
creases in real gross domestic product (or gross
national product) follow an oil price shock. If
the maximum decline in real GDP is normalized
by the maximum increase in the price of oil, we
estimate the resulting oil price elasticity of GDP
is –0.008.
10 Our estimate shows a smaller effect
than the –0.02 to –0.076 range reported in a
1987 Energy Modeling Forum study (Hickman,
Huntington, and Sweeney 1987), perhaps be-
cause the model contains commodity prices.
Brown and Yücel (1995) also suggest that the
elasticity of real GDP to changes in oil prices
may have declined with the energy intensity of
the economy since the 1980s and that inclusion
of data for more recent periods could result in a
smaller elasticity estimate.
A shock to oil prices leads to a response
in the price level similar in magnitude to the
response in real GDP. The one-standard-devia-
tion increase in oil prices leads to a 0.006 per-
cent increase in the price level that is 90 percent
complete in the first year. The maximum
response is reached in eighteen months.
Estimated at the peak of the response, the elas-
ticity of the price level with respect to the real
price of oil is 0.011 percent.
The impulse responses of real GDP and
the deflator show that the responses for both
GDP and the deflator are similar in magnitude.
This similarity can be seen in the impulse
response of nominal GDP, which is calculated
from real GDP and the price level.  After the ini-
tial period, the impulse is relatively constant
throughout the time horizon and the magnitude
is very small.
11 Such a finding is roughly consis-
tent with Gordon’s definition of neutral mone-
tary policy. It also suggests the response of real
GDP and the price level are consistent with a
supply-side response to an oil price shock in
which the shift in aggregate supply lowers out-
put and raises prices.
Interest Rates and Monetary Responses. On
the financial side, the oil price shock leads to
increases in all the variables. An increase in oil
prices leads to a rise in the federal funds rate, a
smaller rise in the short-term rate, and an even
smaller rise in the long-term rate. The spread
between long- and short-term interest rates nar-
rows because the long rate rises less than the
short rate.
The federal funds rate rises 0.16 percent
above its preshock value by the fourth month
and then declines until the end of the time hori-
zon. The oil price shock leads the short-term
interest rate to increase 0.1 percent, also by the
fourth month. The maximum increase in the
long rate is 0.07 percent, which occurs at seven
months.
BGW interpret a rising federal funds rate
as tightening by the Federal Reserve, but other
interpretations are possible. If interest rates rise
in response to an oil price shock, a higher fed-
eral funds rate may be needed to hold nominal
GDP constant.
Constant Federal Funds Rate Case. BGW
interpret a constant federal funds rate as a
neutral monetary response. However, if an oil
price shock pushes nominal interest rates up-
ward, holding the federal funds rate constant
could mean an easing of monetary policy. ToFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 20
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examine this issue, we consider the impulse
responses of aggregate economic activity to 
oil price shocks under a counterfactual case in
which the federal funds rate is held constant.
This approach follows the Sims–Zha experi-
ment in the BGW study.
The dotted line in Figure 1 shows the
Sims–Zha case in which the federal funds rate
is held constant. As is shown, the GDP responses
under the Sims–Zha and base cases are identi-
cal for the first three months and very similar for
the next several months. At the ninth month,
real GDP is higher under Sims–Zha than in the
base case and continues to increase throughout
the time horizon.
Similarly, the commodity price responses
in the Sims–Zha and base cases are nearly iden-
tical for the first seven months. Commodity
prices in the Sims–Zha case then rise above the
base case response and remain higher until the
end of the time horizon.
The Sims–Zha case also leads to a higher
price level, but it takes some time for the price
level to rise above the base case values. As with
real GDP and commodity prices, the price level
responds very similarly in the first seven months
under both cases. The price level for the
Sims–Zha case remains lower than the base
case level until the twenty-third month, after
which it surpasses the base level. Hence, the
effect of holding the federal funds rate constant
shows up quickly in real activity and commod-
ity prices but is slower to appear in the general
price level.
The responses of nominal GDP in the
Sims–Zha and base cases are similar for the first
nine months. After that, nominal GDP increases
and remains at least twice its base-case value
until the end of the estimated time horizon.
Using Gordon’s classifications of monetary pol-
icy, the gains in nominal GDP that arise under
the Sims–Zha case suggest that holding the fed-
eral funds rate constant in the face of an oil
price shock represents an accommodative mone-
tary policy.
12 Monetary policymakers can offset
the real losses arising from an oil price shock,
but only at the cost of higher inflation.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
We use impulse responses from a VAR
model economy to assess how oil price shocks
move through major channels of the U.S. econ-
omy to affect aggregate economic activity and
the price level. The model represents the inter-
actions between seven variables: real GDP,
commodity prices, the GDP deflator, oil prices,
the federal funds rate, and short- and long-term
interest rates.
The impulse responses to an oil price
shock show that the model responds to a tem-
porary oil price shock with a decline in real
GDP, increases in the federal funds rate and
other interest rates, and an increase in the price
level. The decline in real GDP and the rise in
the deflator are similar in magnitude, and, con-
sequently, nominal GDP remains relatively con-
stant. Under Gordon’s definition of monetary
neutrality—holding nominal GDP constant—a
rise in the federal funds rate can represent a
neutral monetary policy response to an oil price
shock.
When the federal funds rate is held con-
stant under the Sims–Zha counterfactual case,
we obtain impulse responses that could be seen
as contrary to BGW’s assertion that a constant
federal funds rate represents a neutral monetary
policy. When the rate is held constant in the
face of an oil price shock, nominal GDP is
higher, as are real GDP, commodity prices, and
the price level—all of which are consistent with
accommodative monetary policy. In addition,
we find the response to oil price shocks appears
more quickly in real GDP and commodity prices
than it does in the overall price level.
The magnitude of the responses may pro-
vide a glimpse of how monetary policy re-
sponded to past oil price shocks. In particular, a
constant nominal GDP suggests that the Federal
Reserve maintained a generally neutral mone-
tary policy. As Koenig (1995) remarks, “That a
large fraction of the business cycle can be attrib-
uted to supply shocks may mean not that mone-
tary policy is ineffective, but that the Federal
Reserve has been doing its job.”
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1 The different definitions of neutrality need not be mutu-
ally exclusive. Koenig (1995) shows that when utility is
logarithmic in consumption, the optimal policy would
be for the monetary authority to target a geometric
weighted average of output and the price level. Such
a policy encompasses rules proposed by Hall (1984)
and Taylor (1985). In the realistic special case where
the market-clearing level of employment is indepen-
dent of productivity, it is optimal for the monetary
authority to target nominal spending.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 22
2 See Barro (1984) and Gordon (1998).
3 Some have argued that Federal Reserve policy has
changed over this estimation period. See Balke and
Emery (1994). We follow BGW and allow for no struc-
tural changes in policy. Estimates using post-1982
data yield substantially similar results.
4 Our ordering follows BGW. We also experimented with
an ordering where oil prices were placed first in the
model. The results were almost identical.
5 Because we couldn’t calculate variance decomposi-
tions with both oil price variables in the model, we cal-
culated two sets of variance decompositions, one with
the Hamilton net oil price and one with first differences
of the log of oil prices. The two sets were almost iden-
tical. Table 1 presents the results with the Hamilton net
oil price in the model.
6 To estimate the impulse responses to a change in oil
prices, we need to simultaneously generate impulses
in both the oil price and the Hamilton net oil price. To
accomplish this task, we use an identity equation that
creates impulses in the Hamilton net oil price from
impulses in oil prices.
7 Oil prices are included in the commodity price index.
8 This result led us to run a model without commodity
prices to see if oil prices became a larger source of
shock. We do not report any results here because the
model was very unstable.
9 Use of an identity equation to generate impulses in the
Hamilton oil price from impulses in oil prices prevents
the estimation of confidence bands.
10 The reported value is calculated on a constant-elasticity
basis.
11 In a test of sensitivity, we ran an unrestricted version of
the BGW model and calculated significance bands
around the impulses in the base case. The results
were substantially similar to those shown here, and the
impulse response of nominal GDP to an oil price shock
was insignificant in the base case.
12 We found substantially similar results with an unre-
stricted version of the BGW model.
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